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ABSTRACT 
We utilize a new set of macroeconomic and regulatory data to analyze 
the evolution of loan loss provisioning practices in the Greek banking 
system over the period 2005-2015. We explore the determinants of the 
aggregate loan loss reserves to total loans ratio, which reflects the 
accumulation of provisions net of write-offs, and constitutes an 
important metric of the credit quality of loan portfolios. Our results 
suggest that domestic credit institutions respond relatively quickly to 
macroeconomic shocks, though the latter’s effects on the provisioning 
behavior of the domestic banking system show significant persistence. 
Furthermore, the impact of macroeconomic shocks on the loan loss 
reserves ratio has become stronger (both in terms of magnitude and 
statistical significance) following the outbreak of the Greek sovereign 
debt crisis. From a macro policy perspective, this result indicates that a 
sustainable stabilization of macroeconomic conditions is a key 
precondition for safeguarding domestic financial stability. For a 
regulatory standpoint, it suggests that the possibility of macroeconomic 
regime-related effects on banks’ provisioning policies should be taken 
into account when macro prudential stress tests of the banking system 
are designed and implemented. 
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The Determinants of Loan Loss Provisions:  
An Analysis of the Greek Banking System in 
Light of the Sovereign Debt Crisis 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Non-performing loans (NPLs) and loan loss provisions (LLPs) have 
generally been considered to be the main transmission channels of 
macroeconomic shocks to banks’ balance sheets. Provisions represent 
an important quantitative indicator of the credit quality of loan 
portfolios. Banks take them in anticipation of potential losses and they 
are a key contributor to fluctuations in bank earnings and capital 
(Hoggarth and Pain, 2002). In effect, loss provisions constitute a tool for 
adjusting the historical value of loans to reflect their true value 
(Dinamona, 2008). Numerous empirical studies have examined the 
behavior of provisioning practices based on data for individual banks or 
aggregate data for one or more countries. Some of the issues and 
testable hypotheses examined in these contributions include: 
procyclicality of provisioning policies, the role of provisioning in the 
broader context of capital regulation and the use of provisions for 
managing earnings.  
Using a new set of macroeconomic and regulatory data this study looks 
at the evolution of provisioning practices in the Greek banking system 
over the period 2005-2015. This is performed by examining the 
determinants of the aggregate (industry-wide) loan loss reserves to total 
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loans ratio, which reflects the accumulation of provisions net of write-
offs and constitutes an important metric of the credit quality of loan 
portfolios. Our empirical findings make several contributions to the 
literature. While in other periphery economies (e.g. Ireland, Spain and 
Cyprus) the outbreak of the recent crisis was mainly concentrated in 
over-levered domestic banking systems, in Greece’s case it was the 
outcome of a huge fiscal derailment that eventually mutated to a severe 
domestic recession and a full-blown financial sector crisis. Between Q1 
2008 and Q4 2015, the ratio of non-performing loans to total bank loans 
in Greece increased by 30.9ppts (and by 38.4ppts if restructured loans 
are also accounted for), hitting 35.6 percent (and 43.5 percent, 
respectively) at the end of that period2. In addition, the unprecedented 
(in size and scope) restructuring of privately-held Greek pubic debt in 
early 2012 completely wiped out the capital base of major Greek banks, 
necessitating a major recapitalization of the domestic banking system in 
the following year. Two additional recapitalizations of the systemic 
banks followed (in 2014 and in late 2015) to address severe liquidity and 
solvency problems faced by these institutions due to the sizeable 
drawdown of deposits and the sharp increase of bad loans3. In this 
                                                 
2 Monokroussos, Thomakos and Alexopoulos (2016a) argue that the primary cause of the sharp 
increase of non-performing loans in Greece following the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis can be 
mainly attributed to the unprecedented contraction of domestic economic activity and the 
subsequent rise in unemployment. In addition, their findings offer no empirical evidence in support of 
a range of examined hypotheses assuming overly aggressive lending practices by major Greek banks 
or any systematic efforts to boost current earnings by extending credit to lower credit quality clients. 
3
 The last capital raising exercise of Greece’s four systemic banks was successfully completed in 
December 2015. Total financing from official sources (i.e., the ESM through the Hellenic Financial 
Stability Fund) to recapitalize these banks was limited to just €5.43bn as two of them, Eurobank and 
Alpha Bank, managed to fully cover their respective capital shortfalls (under both the baseline and the 
adverse scenario) exclusively through internal capital raising means (LME) and private-sector funds 
injection. This was below the amount committed (up to €25bn) in the context of Greece’s new bailout 
programme for recapitalization and resolution purposes. Greece’s systemic banks have been 
exempted from the EU-wide stress testing exercise that was launched in late February 2016, on the 
basis that they have been adequately recapitalized quite recently. 
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context, it is of primary importance to analyze the provisioning policies 
of domestic credit institutions, especially as Greece remains a crucial 
factor influencing macroeconomic and financial system stability in the 
common currency area. 
Second, a thorough understanding of the determinants and the behavior 
of bank provisioning policies is key for designing countercyclical 
provisioning policies that aim to alleviate the amplifying macroeconomic 
effects of bank lending practices along the business cycle. This is 
particularly relevant not only for the periphery economies but also for 
the euro area as a whole, given the primary role of the regulated 
banking system as a provider of liquidity to the real economy. The 
existence of provisioning policies that encourage credit institutions to 
behave in a more forward-looking way by providing for lean years during 
good years is also important from a systemic stability standpoint. In this 
context, it is not a surprise that in the case of Greece domestic financial 
stability constitutes a key pillar of the current stabilization programme, 
with particular emphasis on the management of bad loans and reforms 
to the domestic regulatory and legal framework in dealing with private 
sector insolvency.  
Third, the behavior of provisioning policies in the Greek banking system 
is a topic that has not been thoroughly analyzed in the past. 
Furthermore, our study features some novel aspects relative to a (pretty 
limited) number of earlier contributions. For instance, compared to the 
data panel estimation methods that have been mostly used in earlier 
studies, we estimate a number of vector autoregession (VAR) models 
that relate loans loss reserves to a range of macroeconomic and banking 
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system-specific drivers. This gives us the additional advantage of 
addressing potential endogeneity issues and allows us to fully capture 
the dynamic interactions between different types of determinants. As a 
robustness check, we also run a series of single equation models that 
express loss reserves as a function of macro- and bank-related variables 
that have been found to be significant in the VAR equations.  
Fourth, our study utilizes a fully-updated set of macroeconomic and 
banking-sector quarterly data spanning the period 2005-2015. This time 
horizon covers a significant part of the high growth period that followed 
the country’s euro area entry as well as the years after the outbreak of 
the Greek sovereign debt crisis in late 2009/early 2010.  
Finally, in addition to examining the robustness of some earlier empirical 
findings in the context of our extended data set, we test a number of 
new hypotheses that appear to have important macroeconomic and 
policy-related implications. Among others, we empirically document 
that, at an aggregate level, Greek banks generally behave in line with the 
stylized facts of provisioning policy procyclicality, taking higher 
provisions (and increasing their loan loss reserves) when domestic 
macroeconomic conditions deteriorate. International experience shows 
that the pro-cyclical behavior of bank provisioning practices can be 
potentially mitigated by the impact of bank earnings. That is, provided 
that banks provision considerably more when earnings are high (and vice 
versa). Such a behavior contributes to banks’ financial soundness and 
implies a positive association between loan loss provisions and earnings 
(income smoothing hypothesis). Since our study lacks income statement 
data, we cannot directly test the latter hypothesis. However, the data at 
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hand do allow us to test the so-called capital management hypothesis, 
which postulates that banks with low regulatory capital are inclined to 
take more general provisions in order to keep their capital ratios 
adequate. Our empirical findings do not support the latter hypothesis. 
Furthermore, they are in general agreement with the view that the 
unprecedented domestic recession is the primary cause of the credit 
quality deterioration witnessed in the portfolios of major Greek banks in 
recent years.  
Separately, our estimates show that domestic banks respond relatively 
quickly to macroeconomic shocks, with the peak quarterly change in the 
loan loss reserves ratio (i.e., the flow of provisions net of write offs) 
being realized within two quarters. Yet, the effects of such shocks on the 
provisioning behavior of the domestic banking system show significant 
persistence. For instance, the impact of GDP shocks on loss reserves dies 
out in about 10 quarters, while the impact of shocks on the 
unemployment rate persists for a considerably longer period. In terms of 
quantitative impacts, our bi-variate VAR estimates show that a 1 
percentage point (ppt) decline (increase) in real GDP growth leads to an 
increase (decline) of 0.11ppts in the quarterly change of the loss 
reserves ratio after a quarter, with the corresponding long-run effect 
being around 0.18ppts.  
Another interesting finding of our analysis is that the impact of 
macroeconomic shocks on the loan loss reserves ratio has become 
stronger (both in terms of magnitude and statistical significance) 
following the outburst of the Greek sovereign debt crisis. From a macro 
policy perspective, this result indicates that a sustainable stabilization of 
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macroeconomic conditions is a key precondition for safeguarding 
domestic financial stability. For a regulatory standpoint, it suggests that 
the possibility of macroeconomic regime-related effects on banks’ 
provisioning policies should be taken into account when macro 
prudential stress tests of the banking system are designed and 
implemented.   
As a final note to this section, we emphasize that our analysis does not 
explicitly account for the three major bank recapitalizations that took 
place in the Greek banking system over the period 2012-2015. Naturally, 
these recapitalizations facilitated the effort of domestic banks to reach 
adequate provisioning levels for their loan portfolios. In any case, we 
note that the main aim of our study is to decipher the long-term macro 
and bank-specific determinants of the provisioning behavior of Greek 
credit institutions, regardless of such one-off events as the 
aforementioned recapitalizations. Furthermore, as it will be shown in the 
empirical part of our analysis, our formal statistical tests do not identify 
any structural breaks around the relevant bank recapitalization dates.   
The rest of this document is structured as follows: Chapter 2 includes a 
literature review of the macro- and micro-related determinants of 
banks’ loan provisioning practices; Chapter 3 provides a bird’s eye view 
on the evolution of problem loans and bank provisioning policies in 
Greece in the years before and after the outbreak of the global crisis; 
Chapter 4 discusses our data and empirical methodology; Chapter 5 
presents our empirical results and discusses their policy implications; 
and Chapter 6 concludes. 
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2. What determines banks’ provisioning practices? 
 
Many banking-sector variables are potentially able to convey signals 
about the evolution of banks’ riskiness over the business cycle; however, 
non-performing loans and loan loss provisions have generally been 
considered to be the main transmission channels of macroeconomic 
shocks to banks’ balance sheets (Quagliariello, 2007). Provisions 
represent an important quantitative indicator of the credit quality of 
banks’ portfolios. Banks take them in anticipation of potential loan 
losses. In addition, provisions constitute a key contributor to fluctuations 
in earnings and capital (Hoggarth and Pain, 2002). In effect, loan loss 
provisions constitute a tool for adjusting the historical value of loans to 
reflect their true value (Dinamona, 2008). 
In the beginning of a typical expansionary phase corporate profits 
improve, collateral values rise and households form optimistic 
expectations about their future finances. These dynamics eventually lead 
to an acceleration of banks’ lending activities, which are often 
accompanied by a gradual loosening of credit standards and a reduction 
of provisions for future losses (see e.g. Keeton, 1999 and Fernandez De 
Lis et al., 2000). The literature identifies a number of causes for such a 
behavior on the part of bank managers. These include, among others, 
disaster myopia (Guttentag et al., 1986), herding behavior (Rajan, 1994), 
lack of institutional memory (Berger and Udell, 2003), principal-agent 
problems (Perez et al, 2006) and signaling (Ahmed et al., 1996). The 
latter is on the basis that higher provisions are interpreted by 
stakeholders as a signal of lower quality portfolios.  
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International experience suggests that banks’ increasingly liberal credit 
practices during the more advanced stages of an economic upturn may 
take the form of “negative NPV” strategies, involving lower interest 
charges and/or increased lending to low-credit quality borrowers (Rajan, 
1994). Such strategies usually backfire during recessionary phases, when 
credit risks actually materialize. In an economic recession, the rise of 
unemployment and the decline in household and corporate incomes 
hinder the debt servicing capacity of borrowers. The incipient rise in 
problem loans and the decline in collateral values lead to a serious 
tightening of credit conditions as banks become increasingly unwilling to 
extend new credit in an environment characterized by increased 
information asymmetries with respect to the actual credit quality of 
borrowers. The whole situation is exacerbated by a notable 
deterioration in banks’ balance sheets due to the incipient rise in non-
performing exposures at a time when additional capital is either more 
costly to acquire or simply nonexistent.  Banks react by scaling back 
lending, a course of action that contributes to an acceleration of the 
economic downturn (procyclicality). The feedback effect from bank 
credit to the real economy may be particularly pronounced in economies 
where the biggest share of private sector financing takes place through 
the domestic banking system and direct access to wholesale credit 
markets is not an option for many firms.  
Perez et al. (2006) argue that in economic upturns banks increase loan 
growth due to principal-agent problems, herd behavior and short-term 
objectives. For instance, with a view to obtain a reasonable return on 
equity for their shareholders, managers may engage in riskier activities 
and put more emphasis on their own rewards, which may be based 
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more on growth objectives than on profitability targets. In such 
situations, managers may have incentives to increase loans growth, even 
in periods of declining profitability. Herd behavior may be another 
reason for higher loan growth volatility. During boom periods, many 
banks are encouraged to increase loans volume in order to preserve 
their market share. Another reason may relate to banks’ focus on short-
term objectives. Looking at some of these issues from another angle, 
Cavallo and Majnoni (2001) rely on an agency approach to explain the 
difficultly faced by the regulation of banks’ provisioning practices. The 
authors suggest that the imperfect control and monitoring ability of 
insiders (bank managers and majority shareholders) by outsiders 
(minority shareholders or the fiscal authority) is for banks as for non-
financial corporations a source of agency problems. However banks, due 
to the safety net, may face a very specific set of agency costs.    
The literature has extensively studied the causes of the procyclical (and, 
in some instances, backward-looking) behavior of banks’ credit policies 
and provisioning practices. As regards the latter, Borio et al. (2001) 
demonstrate that provisions increase during the recession, reaching 
their maximum one year after the real deceleration of the economy. The 
procyclical behavior of provisions constitutes an important challenge for 
banks and regulatory authorities alike. From a regulatory standpoint, it is 
of great importance to design countercyclical provisioning policies 
aiming to alleviate the amplifying macroeconomic effects of bank 
lending practices along the business cycle. From the standpoint of bank 
stakeholders, it is important for banks to behave in a more forward-
looking way by providing for bad years during good years.  
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Numerous empirical studies have examined the behavior of banks’ 
provisioning policies based on bank-specific or aggregate (industry-wide) 
data for one or more countries; see e.g. Bikker and Hu (2001); Cavallo 
and Majnoni (2001); Lobo and Yang (2001); Leaven and Majnoni (2003); 
Bikker and Metzemakers (2005); Forseca and Gonzalez (2005); 
Anandarajan (2005); Bouvatier and Lepetit (2006); Perez et al. (2006); 
and Dewenter and Hess (2006). Some of the issues and testable 
hypotheses examined in these contributions include: procyclicality of 
provisioning policies, the role of provisioning in the broader context of 
capital regulation and the use of provisions for managing earnings.  
Bank’ provisioning practices may differ considerably across countries and 
institutional arrangements and be greatly influenced by existing 
accounting and taxation rules (Dinamona, 2008). Broadly speaking, it is 
common to distinguish between two types of provisioning: general 
provisions and specific provisions. The former are generally taken 
against expected losses on non-impaired loans and are based on a 
probabilistic (and judgmental) assessment of the future evolution of the 
quality of the credit portfolio. The latter are made only when losses are 
known to occur and are somewhat akin to write-offs. 
The aforementioned definitions suggest that general provisioning may 
be subject to a discretionary assessment on the part of bank managers. 
This, in turn, increases the risk of accounts manipulation and explains 
why regulatory authorities have set up rules for this particular class of 
provisions. On the other hand, specific provisions are generally taken 
against loan losses that are known to materialize. This reduces the risk of 
accounts manipulation, but potentially contributes to the amplification 
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of the business cycle (Borio and Lowe, 2001; Bouvatier and Lepetit, 
2006).  
The literature cites several reasons for the potential use of provisioning 
for purposes not directly related to the need to adjust the value of loans 
to more realistic levels. One such use relates to earnings management. 
In more detail, provisions may be increased in good times for use in lean 
years, so as for banks to be able to report a more stable income stream. 
That is, on the basis that the latter is usually a good indication of 
performance from the perspective of stock price stability, credit ratings, 
cost of funds and management rewards (Greenawalt and Sinkey, 1998; 
Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995).  
Separately, though not unrelated to the above argument, general 
provisioning may also be used to manage the capital ratio, particularly if 
general provisions account as regulatory capital (Kim and Kross, 1998; 
Ahmed et al., 1999; Cortavarria et al., 2000). A relevant hypothesis that 
has been tested in the literature conjectures a negative correlation 
between a bank’s capitalization ratio and the level of general loan loss 
provisions.   
Lobo and Yang (2001) show that banks which have a small capital ratio 
can increase their loan loss provisions with the intention to reduce the 
regulatory costs imposed by capital requirements. However, in 
recessionary periods capital becomes expensive and loan loss provisions 
are high. Banks often respond by reducing their loans. Consequently, it is 
difficult for banks to manage their capital by the way of loan loss 
provisions in periods of recession. On their part, Hasan and Wall (2003) 
argue that the effect on earnings is so important that banks’ stock 
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analysts routinely discuss whether a bank has managed its loss 
accounting so as to help smooth earnings or hit the current period’s 
earnings target.  
Finally, another reason may have to do with existing taxation rules. For 
countries in which general provisions are tax deductible, there may be a 
strong incentive for banks to increase general provisions (Cartavarria et 
al., 2000). On the other hand, a very restrictive tax policy may 
discourage banks from adequately provisioning against future loan 
losses (Cavallo and Majnoni, 2001).  To complicate things further, 
taxation rules may interfere with broader state financing objectives, 
especially in countries facing severe fiscal pressure. Overall, the 
disincentives built in different layers of regulation (accounting, fiscal and 
prudential) may jointly explain why loan loss provisions do not often 
reach the required level suggested by expected loan impairments.  
There is a general agreement that unexpected loan losses should be 
covered by bank capital, whereas expected losses by loan loss 
provisions. As a result, cyclical capital shortages may not only be due to 
inadequate risk based capital regulation but most prominently to the 
lack of risk based regulation of banks’ provisioning policies. Given this 
close relation between provisions and capital, a number of studies have 
argued that a sound provisioning policy should be part of any regulations 
on capital requirements (Cavallo and Majnoni, 2001). For instance, these 
authors argue that the lack of a coherent and internationally accepted 
regulation of provisions, as is the case in many emerging markets, 
reduces the usefulness of minimum capital regulation. Furthermore, the 
lack of a well-defined and internationally agreed code of conduct may 
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give rise to a multiplicity of institutional solutions. In several cases, for 
instance, the protection of outsider claims to banks’ incomes may be too 
rigid or too expensive, providing a disincentive to adequately provision 
for loan losses, with negative implications for banking system stability.    
3. The evolution of NPLs and LLRs in the Greek banking system 
 
In Greece, a country that has experienced one of the most severe and 
prolonged recessions in recent economic history, cumulative real GDP 
losses between Q1 2008 and Q4 2015 amounted to around 26 percent, 
while the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans increased by 
30.9ppts (and by 38.4ppts if restructured loans are also accounted for), 
hitting 35.6 percent (and 43.5 percent, respectively) at the end of that 
period. This followed double-digit growth of domestic bank lending in 
the post euro-entry years that led to the 2007/2008 global financial 
crisis. However, it is important to note that the global crisis found 
Greece’s private sector not particularly over-levered relative to other 
euro area economies. In terms of nominal amounts, the total 
outstanding stock of NPLs (including restructured loans) in Greek 
commercial banks’ balance sheets stood at €98.4bn at the end of 2015, 
with corporate bad loans accounting for 57.1 percent of the total stock. 
The overwhelming portion of the latter share consists of bad debts owed 
by very small, small and medium-sized firms. The corresponding 
percentages for mortgage and consumer problem loans were 27.6 and 
15.2 at the end of 2015. In terms of provisioning, the coverage of NPLs 
(excluding restructured loans) by loan loss reserves ranged between 50 
and 60 percent during the initial part of our sample (Q1 2005-Q4 2008). 
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The said coverage fell precipitously in the following few quarters 
(reached a low of 36.8 percent in Q4 2009), before increasing gradually 
thereafter and hitting a post-crisis high of 56.7 at the end of 2015 (figure 
A). Finally, the flow (measured as e.g. the quarterly change of the level) 
of NPLs including restructured loans embarked on an upward path after 
the outbreak of the global crisis, hitting a record peak of €13.8bn in Q1 
2013. This compares with an average quarterly flow of c. €3.5bn in the 
prior three years and can be mainly attributed to the absorption of the 
balance sheets of the Cypriot subsidiaries in Greece by one of the 
domestic systemic banks. The pace of increase of the said flow measure 
declined significantly in 2014 (it even recorded a negative reading of c. - 
€2.4bn in Q4 2014), it hit a two-year high in Q1 2015 (€2.35bn) and 
ended that year with a small increase of €0.2bn. 
Figure A: coverage of NPLs (excluding restructured loans) by Loan Loss Reserves. 
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3.1  A brief history of domestic banking-system recapitalizations 
following the outbreak of the Greek sovereign debt crisis 
Greece’s four largest (systemic) banks were first recapitalized in May 
2012 via a bridge HFSF facility of €18bn, which aimed to bring their 
capital adequacy ratio to 8% (minimum required threshold under Basel 
II). The implementation of the aforementioned followed the publication 
of domestic banks’ results for FY-2011, which revealed that the 
restructuring of privately-held Greek sovereign debt (PSI) had 
completely wiped out their capital base. Then, a full-scale 
recapitalization of domestic credit institutions was conducted between 
May and June 2013, following an exercise carried out by the Bank of 
Greece (BoG), which estimated the capital needs of the four systemic 
banks at €27.5bn for the period 2012-2014. Under a minister cabinet 
act, agreed in consultation with the European Commission, the ECB and 
the IMF, Greek banks had to meet a Core Tier 1 capital ratio of at least 
6% exclusively through the issuance of common shares.  Private 
shareholders were required to cover at least 10% of new common equity 
capital so as to keep credit institutions privately run. The remaining 90% 
would have to be covered through the issue of common shares to the 
Hellenic Stability Fund (HFSF) with restrictive voting rights. The 
remaining capital requirement i.e., above the 6% core tier 1 ratio- that 
was necessary to meet the BoG’s core Tier 1 target (estimated at 9%) 
would be covered through the issue of contingent convertible bonds 
(CoCos) taken up by the HFSF- upon approval of the general meeting of 
shareholders of each credit institution. However, private sector 
participation was enough to cover at least 10% of total capital needs, 
allowing the coverage of the full required amount solely through 
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common equity. The total share capital increase for the four systemic 
banks amounted to €28.6bnm, above the capital needs estimated by the 
BoG, as the HFSF approved and provided Piraeus Bank with a further 
capital contribution of €1.1 in order to meet the additional capital 
requirements arising from the purchase of: (i) the “healthy” part of 
publicly owned Agriculture Bank of Greece (ATEbank) that was resolved 
in July 2012 (€570mn); and (ii) balance sheet items of the Greek 
branches of 3 Cypriot banks (€524mn). Out of the total share capital 
increase, HFSF contribution (in the form of EFSF bonds) stood at €25bn. 
The remaining €3.6bn was covered by private investors who were 
granted warrants as an incentive enabling them to purchase the 
remaining common shares from the HFSF at a future time.  
The second bank recapitalization (March-May 2014) was based on the 
results of an independent diagnostic study conducted by Blackrock 
under the supervision of the Bank of Greece. The exercise aimed to 
ensure that the financial system was “well prepared to face the impact 
of expected losses from the high-level of non-performing loans” and was 
conducted under an amended recapitalization framework. Incentives 
provided by the HFSF to the private sector in the first recapitalization 
exercise, such as the issuance of warrants, were no longer foreseen and 
any injection of capital (via the HFSF) into viable banks would be done 
through subscription of ordinary shares carrying full voting rights, on the 
condition that at least 50% of the total share capital increase would be 
covered by the private sector. BlackRock Solutions estimated that the 
total capital needs of the domestic banks over the period June 2013-
December 2016 would amount to €6.4bn under the baseline scenario. 
All four systemic banks opted for a share capital increase via private 
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placements and public offerings. Solely with the participation of the 
private sector, the share capital increase amounted to €8.3bn, covering 
fully the capital needs of these banks and allowing for the repayment of 
the preference shares of Alpha Bank (€950mn) and Piraeus Bank 
(€750mn) held by the state. As a result, the HFSF’s shareholding in all 
four systemic banks was reduced significantly; in Alpha Bank, it dropped 
from 81.7% to 69.9%, in Eurobank, from 95.2% to 35.4%, in National 
Bank of Greece from 84.4% to 57.2% and in Piraeus Bank from 67.3% to 
66.9%.  
In line with the conditionality underling Greece’s 3rd adjustment 
programme that was agreed with official creditors in August 2015, 
Greece’s four system banks underwent another recapitalization that was 
successfully completed in December 2015. A comprehensive assessment 
carried out by the ECB estimated total capital needs of €4.4bn under a 
baseline scenario and €14.4bn under an adverse scenario. Banks had to 
exhaust all private means to cover at least the capital needs identified 
under the baseline scenario. Any remaining shortfall (under the adverse 
scenario) would be covered through a combination of common equity 
capital and CoCos while any common shares acquired by the HFSF would 
have full voting rights. Two banks, Eurobank and Alpha Bank, managed 
to raise the required capital exclusively through internal capital raising 
means (LME) and private sector injections while the capital shortfalls of 
the other two were partially covered by the HFSF via ordinary shares and 
(CoCos). As a result, total financing from official sources (i.e., the ESM 
through the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund) was limited to just 
€5.43bn. This was below the amount committed (up to €25bn) in the 
context of Greece’s new bailout programme for bank recapitalization 
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and resolution purposes. The HFSF’s shareholding in all four core banks 
was reduced further; in Alpha Bank, it dropped from 69.9% to 11.0%, in 
Eurobank, from 35.4% to 2.4%, in National Bank of Greece, from 57.2% 
to 40.4% and in Piraeus Bank, from 66.9% to 26.4%. 
  
4.  Data and methodology 
 
4.1  Data  
For the purpose of our empirical analysis, we utilize a novel data set of 
macroeconomic and bank-specific variables (quarterly observations) 
spanning the period between Q1 2005 and Q4 2015. Our data sources 
include Bank of Greece, Greece’s statistics agency (EL.STAT.) and 
EUROSTAT. 
4.2  Personal circumstances 
Loan loss reserves: aggregate (system-wide) loan loss reserves to total 
loans ratio (acronym: LLR). This variable constitutes the primary focus of 
our empirical study. The data are taken from the consolidated balance 
sheet of the domestic banking system, which is regularly reported by the 
Bank of Greece. Loan loss reserves constitute a stock variable, while loan 
loss provisions (not examined in this study) a flow variable4. The 
following relationship links loan loss reserves and loan loss provisions: 
                                            LLRt  = LLRt-1 + LLPt  - WOt                                                  (1) 
Where, LLR denotes loan loss reserves, LLP loan loss provisions, WO 
write offs, and t is the time subscript (here it measures quarters). As can 
                                                 
4
 Data for loan loss provisions can be found in banks’ income statements. 
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be inferred by the above equation, the change (Δ) of the stock of loan 
loss reserves between quarter t-1 and quarter t equals the flow of 
provisions taken in quarter t minus the loans that are written off banks’ 
balance sheets in that quarter. As noted in Bikker and Metzemakers 
(2005), loan loss reserves and provisions are different in character. LLPs 
reflect discrete managerial decisions at a point in time, which may be 
more cycle-dependent. On the other hand, LLRs reflect the respective 
accumulation of provisions (net of write offs) that, on average, ought to 
better reflect actual expected loan losses. Analysts, regulators and bank 
managers regularly view the latter variable as an important metric for 
the credit quality of a loan portfolio. 
4.3  Explanatory variables 
 
4.3.1  Realized credit risk variables 
Non-performing loans: Greek banks’ loans overdue for more than ninety 
(90) days. For the purposes of our analysis, we utilize supervisory data 
for the aggregate (industry-wide) stock of bad loans including 
restructured loans. The relevant variable examined in the study is the 
ratio of bad loans to the total outstanding stock of loans (acronym: 
TNPL). As noted in Quagliariello (2007), this variable can be viewed as a 
reliable proxy for the overall quality of a bank’s portfolio, implying a 
positive association between non-performing loans and loan loss 
reserves.   
Default rate: The stock of bad debts is considered by some authors to be 
only a rough measure of bank credit quality as some of these debts are 
simply written off as time elapses. For this reason, our study also 
examines the behavior of a proxy for the loans classified as non-
  20 
performing for the first time in the reference period. The relevant 
explanatory variable we use is the ratio of the flow of loans classified as 
bad debt in the reference period to the total stock of performing loans 
of the prior period. The respective acronym is DR. The expected sign of 
this variable is positive on the basis that banks that are not able to 
screen potential debtors are more likely to incur loan losses in the future 
(Quagliarello, 2007).   
4.3.2  Macroeconomic variables 
Real GDP growth (RGDP): an aggregate indicator of the state of the 
macro economy and the phase of the business cycle. If the procyclicality 
hypothesis holds (i.e., credit risks increase in a downturn and vice versa) 
then there is a negative association between LLRs and real GDP growth. 
For instance, in their empirical study involving 8,000 bank-year 
observations from 29 OECD countries between 1991 and 2001, Bikker 
and Metzemakers (2005) find a negative and significant coefficient of 
GDP growth, with the respective short- and long-run elasticities of the 
effects on the LLR ratio being -0.77 and -4.955. These authors state that 
their findings imply procyclicality and, probably, a lack of forward 
looking risk assessment over the business cycle. A negative (but mostly 
insignificant) association between the loans loss reserves ratio and GDP 
growth is also found in Makri (2015), a recent study utilizing both 
aggregate and bank-specific data for the Greek banking system. An 
alternative view to the procyclicality argument has been proposed by 
Borio et al. (2001) and Lowe (2002), who claim that risks are actually 
                                                 
5
 In their study, Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) measure loan loss reserves as a ratio to total banking-
system assets. In the study presented in this paper, we express LLRs as ratio to total outstanding bank 
loans. 
  21 
built up during economic booms, when loan growth accelerates. If the 
latter hypothesis holds, then we should expect a positive association 
between LLRs and real GDP growth.   
Labour market conditions: unemployment rate as a percentage of the 
total labor force (UNPL). In line with the procyclicality argument, a 
positive association holds between the LLR ratio and the unemployment 
rate.  
Collateral values: index of prices of dwellings, deflated by the 
harmonized inflation rate for Greece (RHP)6. One should expect a 
negative relationship between collateral values and loan loss reserves. 
That is, provided that the procyclical hypothesis for bank provisions 
holds and housing prices constitute a good coincident indicator for the 
phase of the business cycle. In line with Quagliarello (2007), the impact 
of collateral values on the overall riskiness of a bank’s loan portfolio may 
also be given an alternative interpretation; namely, in periods of 
increased collateral valuations, banks may be tempted to reduce their 
screening activity making their portfolios riskier. This behavior would 
then lead to higher NPLs (and thus, the need for higher provisioning), 
implying a positive association between LLR and RHP7.   
                                                 
6
 Bank of Greece publishes a newer index based on apartment prices. However, our study uses the 
historical series of the index of prices of dwellings due to the greater time span of the latter series. 
7
 As noted in Borio (2012), combining credit and property prices appears to be the most parsimonious 
way to capture the core features of the link between the financial cycle, the business cycle and 
financial crises. Analytically, this is the smallest set of variables needed to replicate adequately the 
mutually reinforcing interaction between financial constraints (credit) and perceptions of value and 
risks (property prices). Empirically, there is a growing literature documenting the information content 
of credit, as reviewed by Dell’Arricia et al (2012), and property prices (eg IMF, 2003) taken individually 
for business fluctuations and systemic crises with serious macro dislocations. But it is the interaction 
between these two sets of variables that has the highest information content. 
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Debt service cost: real interest rate on bank loans calculated using as 
weights the outstanding volumes of domestic monetary financial 
institutions’ loans vis-à-vis euro area private-sector residents (L_RIR). 
Many empirical studies document a positive link between lending 
interest rates and non-performing loans, particularly in the case of 
floating rate loans (see e.g. Louzis et al., 2012, Beck et al., 2013; and 
Klein 2013). This should also imply a positive association between real 
loan rates and the LLR ratio. In our analysis, the aforementioned 
variables enter in first-differences (quarterly change in the respective 
real loan interest rate), alleviating concerns related to the fact that 
interest rates are usually higher in expansionary phases, when NPLs tend 
to be low (negative association).8 
Inflation (INFL): herein proxied by the quarterly change in the 
harmonized consumer price index for Greece. The impact of inflation on 
future bad debts (and, by implication, on banks’ provisioning policies) 
may be ambiguous (see e.g. Nkusu, 2011). On the one hand, higher 
inflation erodes the real value of outstanding debt, thus making debt 
servicing easier. On the other hand, it may reduce real incomes (when 
prices are sticky) and/or instigate an interest rate tightening by the 
monetary authority.  
4.3.3  Bank-specific variables 
The pro-cyclical behavior of bank provisioning practices implied by a 
negative association between loan loss reserves and GDP growth may be 
                                                 
8
 A casual look at the evolution of the aforementioned variables in levels (data available on request) 
shows that, with the exception of a significant decline experienced in 2010, real loan rates in Greece 
have been on a upward path in more recent years due to strengthening disinflation and excessively 
tight conditions in the domestic lending market. At the end of 2015 (latest part of our data sample), 
real rending rates were higher relative to their levels in the pre-crisis period under examination. 
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mitigated by the potential impact of bank earnings (income smoothing 
hypothesis). That is, provided that banks provision considerably more 
when earnings are high (and vice versa). Such a behavior contributes to 
banks’ financial soundness (by reducing procyclicality) and implies a 
positive association between loan loss provisions and earnings. Since our 
study lacks income statement data, we cannot directly test the income 
smoothing hypothesis. However, the data at hand do allow us to test the 
existence of other effects that could somewhat mitigate the 
procyclicality of banks’ provisioning policies. As analyzed below, this can 
be done by looking at e.g. the growth of total loans and its impact on 
loan loss reserves.   
Bank solvency and capitalization: industry-wide solvency ratio, measured 
as total common shareholders equity to total bank assets (ETA). Based 
on a number of earlier empirical studies, a negative association between 
the capital to assets ratio and provisions provides support to the capital 
management hypothesis, which postulates that banks with low 
regulatory capital are inclined to take more general loan loss provisions 
in order to keep their capital ratios adequate. That is, especially if 
general provisions are tax deductible. On the other hand, expected gains 
to boosting capital may be very small once a bank attains a sufficiently 
high capital adequacy ratio (Hasan and Wall, 2003; Bikker and 
Metzemakers, 2005). An alternative phenomenon causing a negative 
relationship between provisions and capital may relate to the fact that 
some banks may simply hold a greater share of risky loans (and thus, 
incur more losses and provision more) and, at the same time, have a 
lower capital ratio (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005).  
  24 
Loans growth rate (LG_R): an indicator of loan portfolio riskiness. In line 
with the procyclical credit hypothesis, there must be a negative 
association between the said variable and banks’ loan loss provisions. 
That is, especially if loans growth in good economic times is associated 
with reduced monitoring efforts. An alternative hypothesis is that loan 
portfolio risk is actually building up during economic booms, which 
implies a positive coefficient on loans growth (Borio et al., 2001; and 
Lowe, 2002).9 
Loans to assets (LtA): ratio of banking-system wide loans to total assets. 
This is another indicator of the overall riskiness of banks’ portfolios. In 
the context of our study, it would be of interest to estimate model 
specifications that include both LG and LtA as potential explanatory 
variables of loan loss reserves. For instance, the finding of a negative 
coefficient on the growth of loans in conjunction with a positive 
coefficient on the loans to assets ratio could be interpreted as evidence 
supporting the view that provisions increase as a share of total assets 
when the increase of new lending tends to reinforce the risk exposure of 
bank portfolios (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005).  
Loans-to-deposits interest rate spread (LD_IRS): the interest rate spread 
between loans and deposits could be viewed as an indicator of the 
relative competitiveness conditions in the domestic loans and deposits 
                                                 
9
 An interesting interpretation of the growth of performing loans as a potential determinant of Italian 
banks’ provisioning policies is provided in Quagliariello (2007). Using a large dataset of Italian 
intermediaries over the period 1985-2002, the study estimates both static and dynamic models to 
investigate whether loan loss provisions and non-performing loans show a cyclical pattern. The author 
notes that the growth of performing loans may signal a positive phase of the business cycle if it is led 
by demand factors (suggesting a negative sign) or an aggregate supply policy of banks, which in turn 
involves lower credit standards, the exposure to excessive risks and higher future provisions (positive 
sign). In line with this reasoning, the growth of performing loans may show a negative sign when 
current values are considered and a positive sign when lagged (see also Salas and Saurina, 2002). 
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markets or the degree of risk taking on the part of domestic credit 
institutions, implying a positive association with non-performing loans 
and hence provisions. Table A provides a summary of the sign(s) of the 
theoretical relationship between the LLR ratio and the set of explanatory 
variables examined in this study. 
Table A: Potential drivers of Loan loss reserves. 
variable acronym sign of theoretical relationship
Non-performing loans to total loans NPL (+)
Default rate DR (+)
Real GDP growth 
RGDP
(-)
Unemployment rate UNPL (+)
Real growth of the index of prices of dwellings RHP (-)
Harmonized consumer price index INLF (-) / (+)
Real interest rate on bank loans L_RIR (+)
Common equity to total assets ETA (-) / (+)
Loans growth  LG (-) / (+)
Loans to deposits LtD (+)
Loans to total assets LtA (+)
Loans-to-deposits interest rate spread LD_IRS (+)
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4.4  Methodology 
Since our time series are relatively short, we avoid complicated methods 
that could potentially require a larger data sample. Instead, we employ 
an unrestricted vector autoregession (VAR) in differences as well as 
single equations estimated in different samples, with the aim to examine 
the robustness of our empirical results and identify potential regime-
switching behaviors.  
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The standard VAR model with p lags, when the variables are expressed 
in differences, is written as: 
                    , ,
1
p
q t i q t i t ty A y X u

 

                     (1) 
,q ty is a ( 1)K   column vector, 1( ,..., )k    , 1( ,..., )kB B   are ( 1)K    
column vectors of  intercept terms , iA   are  ( )K K  coefficient matrices, 
tu is . . (0, )i i d N  and tX  is an exogenous variable, herein the crisis dummy 
C10  as explained in the next section. The subscripts in the vector of our 
variables are used to identify the different models and variable 
combinations as follows: 
* * *
,
, * *
, , , , , _ ,
[ , ] , 1,...,35
, , , _ , _ , _
t t t t t t t
q t t
qt t t t t t
TNPL UNPL INFL RGDP RHP DR L RIR
y LLR for q
ETA LtD LtA LD IR LG R PERFO RG
 
  

 
The optimal lag length is chosen by fitting the VAR representation 
sequentially with lag orders max0,1,...,p p  and selecting the value that 
minimizes standard information criteria, with the following (generic) 
form:  
    
~
( ) ln ( ) ( , )uIC p p h p n                 (5) 
where h(p,n) stands for the penalty function 
~
1
1
ˆ ˆ( )
T
u t t
t
p T  

   of the 
respective VAR(p) model. Depending on the penalty function, the 
information criteria used include the Akaike Information criterion (AIC), 
the Schwarz criterion (SC) and the Hannan-Quinn criterion (HQ). We 
mostly rely on the latter for selecting the lag length.  
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Finally, we briefly illustrate below the causality testing, partitioning the 
vector of interest in m-dimensional and (K−m)-dimensional sub-
vectors ,a ty  and ,ty : 
,
,
a t
t
t
y
y
y
 
  
 
   and   11, 12,
21, 22,
1...
i i
i
i i
A A
A i p
A A
 
  
 
                (6) 
where iA  are partitioned in accordance with the partitioning of ty , 
,a ty does not Granger-cause ,ty if and only if the following hypothesis 
cannot be rejected: 
   12,: 0 1...o iH A for i p                (7) 
Thus, the null hypothesis is formulated as zero restrictions on the 
coefficients of the lags of a subset of the variables. This is in the form of 
a standard Wald-type test and therefore inference is asymptotically 
normal. After estimating each of the VAR models, a set of standard 
residual and misspecification tests is applied. Detailed results on these 
tests are available on request.  
Selecting the variables presenting the highest stability in terms of 
significance, sign and magnitude, we construct univarite time series 
models and estimate them using both the full time length, from 2005Q1 
to 2015Q4 and the subsample from 2010Q1 onwards. These models 
have the following general representation:   
'
t t ty a B X t     
Where B is either a scalar when we estimate bivariate models or a 
column vector in the case of multivariate analysis. We also include a 
time component to capture any trend like characteristics. Splitting the 
time length into two different samples allows us to examine whether 
any structural break has been created following the outbreak of 
Greece’s sovereign debt crisis in late 2009/early 2010. Besides using 
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different estimation periods, we also conduct a range of stability 
diagnostic tests in order to verify the significance of any structural 
change in the variables under examination.   
We perform two stability diagnostics; namely, the Quandt-Andrews test 
and the Bai-Perron test. We first apply the Quandt-Andrews breakpoint 
test for one or more unknown structural breakpoints in the sample and 
test whether there has been a structural change in a subset of the 
parameters. The Quandt-Likelhood Ratio (QLR) statistic, also called the 
“sup-Wald statistic” is the maximum of all the chow F-statistics over a 
range of 1,      , in which a conventional choice for 1&    is 
such so as to produce the inner 70 percent of the sample (after trimming 
the first and the last 15 percent of observations). Thus, QLR has the 
following form:  
                     1 1max[ ( ), ( 1),..., ( 1), ( )]QLR F F F F                           (8) 
Secondly, we apply the Bai-Perron approach for m potential breaks, 
producing m+1 regimes within the sample. Hence, for the observations   
, 1, 1..., 1j j jT T T   in regime j  we estimate the following regression model: 
' '
t t t j ty X      
for 0,...,j m ;  where X  variables are those whose parameters do not 
vary across regimes, while Z variables have coefficients that are regime 
specific. The procedure begins with the full sample and performs a test 
of parameter constancy with unknown break. If the test rejects the null 
hypothesis of constancy, break date is determined and the sample is 
divided into two samples where single unknown breakpoint tests are 
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performed in each subsample. Each of these tests may be viewed as a 
test of an alternative to the null hypothesis of breaks. The procedure is 
repeated until all of the subsamples do not reject the null hypothesis, or, 
alternatively, until the maximum number of breakpoints allowed or the 
maximum subsample intervals to test is reached. 
5. Empirical analysis and discussion of policy implications    
 
5.1  VARs with macro- and bank-specific variables 
This section discusses the estimates of our vector autoregression (VAR) 
models that analyze the dynamic impact of random disturbances on 
systems incorporating different combinations of the variables under 
study. Compared to the data panel estimation techniques that have 
been extensively used in the literature to analyze non-performing loans 
and bank provisioning policies, the VAR methodology has the advantage 
of addressing the issue of potential endogeneity (by treating all variables 
as endogenous) and of fully capturing the dynamic interactions between 
the different types of potential determinants. The variables utilized in 
the analysis include:  
Δ(LLR): quarterly change in the aggregate (system-wide) loan loss 
reserves to total loans ratio; 
Δ(TNPL): quarterly change in the aggregate (system-wide) ratio of non-
performing loans (including restructured loans) to total loans; 
DR: ratio of the flow of loans classified as bad debt in the reference 
period to the total stock of performing loans of the prior period;  
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RGDP: quarterly growth of Greece’s real GDP;  
Δ(UNPL): quarterly change in Greece’s unemployment rate (all domestic 
industries);  
RHP: real quarterly growth of the residential house prices index;  
Δ(L_RIR): quarterly change of the real interest rate on bank loans 
(calculated using as weights the outstanding volumes of domestic 
monetary financial institutions’ loans vis-à-vis euro area private-sector 
residents);  
Δ(INFL): quarterly change in the harmonized consumer price index for 
Greece;   
Δ(ETA): quarterly change in the aggregate (banking-sector wide) 
solvency ratio, measured as total common shareholders equity to total 
bank assets;   
LG_R: real quarterly growth of bank loans;  
LG_PERFO: real quarterly growth of bank performing loans; 
Δ(LtD): quarterly change of the aggregate (banking sector-wide) loans to 
deposits ratio;  
Δ(LtA): quarterly change of the aggregate (banking sector-wide) loans to 
total assets ratio;  
Δ(LD_IRS): quarterly change of the interest rate spread between loans 
and deposits; and  
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C10: crisis dummy taking the value of 1 from Q1 2010 onwards; and zero 
otherwise.  
The estimates of our VAR model specifications for the ratio of loan loss 
reserves to total loans are shown in Tables (1) to (4). The tables also 
report the results of a series of relevant causality tests, which confirm 
the efficacy of the selected model specifications. In most cases, the 
estimated coefficients have the correct theoretical sign and are 
statistically significant. Furthermore, all estimated VAR models 
presented in this sector pass the usual diagnostic tests as regards model 
specification and stability, selected lag length as well as residual 
autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity and normality (all results are 
available on request).  
Table 1: Estimated models M1-M9 for loans loss provisions. 
 
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 
D(LLR(-1)) -0.29 -0.19 -0.28 -0.30 -0.19 0.16 -0.22 -0.25 -0.23 
t-statistic -1.71 -1.24 -1.58 -1.74 -1.19 0.95 -1.40 -1.63 -1.44 
RGDP(-1) -0.13 
 
  
 
-0.12 -0.12 -0.06 -0.06 
t-statistic -0.77 
 
  
 
-2.17 -2.73 -1.15 -1.14 
D(LLR(-2)) -0.11 
 
  
  
   
t-statistic -2.56 
 
  
  
   
RGDP(-2) -0.07 
 
  
  
   
t-statistic -1.41 
 
  
  
   
D(UNPL(-1)) 
 
0.26  0.21 0.24 
 
 0.22 0.16 
t-statistic 
 
2.78  2.01 2.44 
 
 1.84 1.27 
RHP(-1) 
  
-0.10 -0.07 
  
   
t-statistic 
  
-2.35 -1.43 
  
   
INFL(-1) 
  
  0.13 -0.07    
t-statistic 
  
  1.20 -0.58    
D(L_RIR(-1)) 
  
  
  
-0.13 -0.16 -0.01 
t-statistic 
  
  
  
-1.45 -1.80 -0.29 
C 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
t-statistic 0.62 0.25 0.42 0.24 -0.62 2.53 0.27 0.00 0.41 
 Exogenous-Variables 
C10 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
0.01 0.01 0.01 
t-statistic 3.96 4.27 4.05 4.13 4.34 
 
4.79 4.80 3.45 
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Statistics 
R
2 
0.50 0.49 0.46 0.51 0.51 0.20 0.50 0.55 0.51 
Akaike Criterion -7.88 -7.96 -7.91 -7.97 -7.95 -7.52 -7.95 -7.99 -7.91 
 Causality Wald-Test (P-Values) 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 
RGDP 0.01     0.03 0.01 0.25 0.25 
D(UNPL) 
 
0.00  0.04 0.02   0.07 0.20 
RHP 
 
 0.02 0.15      
INFL 
 
   0.23 0.56    
D(L_RIR) 
 
     0.15 0.07 0.77* 
All 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.03 
Notes: 
1. All variables are expressed in growth rates or first differences with the exception of L_RIR in 
model M9 which is measured in levels. 
2. The first panel of the table presents the estimates and associated t-statistics for the dynamic 
equation; the second panel presents the estimates and associated t-statistics for the exogenous 
(dummy) variable; the third panel presents the standard statistics for goodness of fit (R
2
) and the 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC); and the fourth panel presents
 
the p-values for standard 
causality tests, with the null hypothesis being that the respective explanatory variable does not 
cause LLR. 
3. C10 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 from Q1 2010 onwards and the value zero (0) 
otherwise. 
 
 
Table 2: Estimated models M10-M18 for loans loss provisions. 
 
M10 M11 M12 M13 M14 M15 M16 M17 M18 
D(LLR(-1)) 0.33 0.36 0.31 0.22 -0.15 0.22 0.20 0.18 -0.02 
t-statistic 2.07 2.23 1.88 1.28 -0.75 1.28 1.13 1.04 -0.12 
RGDP(-1) 
 
-0.09 -0.04  
  
-0.08 -0.05  
t-statistic 
 
-1.71 -0.66  
  
-1.66 -0.89  
D(ETA(-1)) 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.04 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.07 
t-statistic 2.54 2.74 2.47 2.17 0.55 2.17 2.20 2.08 1.01 
LG_R(-1) 
  
 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 
t-statistic 
  
 -1.77 -1.24 -1.77 -2.16 -1.85 -1.81 
D(UNPL(-1)) 0.23 
 
0.18 0.18 0.21 0.18  0.11  
t-statistic 2.06 
 
1.29 1.59 2.08 1.59  0.77  
C 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
t-statistic 1.55 1.78 1.60 2.31 0.94 2.31 2.74 2.42 1.44 
 Exogenous-Variables 
C10 
    
0.01 
  
 0.01 
t-statistic 
    
2.88 
  
 2.54 
 
Statistics 
R
2 
0.35 0.33 0.36 0.40 0.51 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.45 
Akaike Criterion 7.72 -7.69 -7.69 -7.76 -7.92 -7.76 -7.77 -7.73 -7.85 
 Causality Wald-Test (P-Values) 
 M10 M11 M12 M13 M14 M15 M16 M17 M18 
  33 
D(UNPL) 0.04  0.20 0.11 0.04 0.11 0.10 0.44  
D(ETA) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.58 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.31 
RGDP 
 
0.09 0.51     0.37  
LG_R 
 
  0.08 0.22 0.08 0.03 0.06 0.07 
 
 
        
All 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 
Notes: 
1. All variables are expressed in growth rates or first differences. 
2. The first panel of the table presents the estimates and associated t-statistics for the dynamic 
equation; the second panel presents the estimates and associated t-statistics for the exogenous 
(dummy) variable; the third panel presents the standard statistics for goodness of fit (R2) and the 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC); and the fourth panel presents the p-values for standard 
causality tests, with the null hypothesis being that the respective explanatory variable does not 
cause LLR. 
3. C10 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 from Q1 2010 onwards and the value zero (0) 
otherwise.  
 
Table 3: Estimated models M19-M27 for loans loss provisions. 
 
M19 M20 M21 M22 M23 M24 M25 M26 M27 
D(LLR(-1)) -0.07 -0.13 -0.12 0.07 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 0.27 -0.01 
t-statistic -0.40 -0.72 -0.66 0.36 -0.10 -0.31 -0.31 1.73 -0.07 
RGDP(-1) 
 
-0.08 0.04  
 
-0.07 -0.06   
t-statistic 
 
-1.59 0.23  
 
-1.55 -1.01   
D(ETA(-1)) 
  
-0.07  
  
   
t-statistic 
  
-1.15  
  
   
LG_R(-1) -0.05 -0.06 0.15  -0.07 -0.07 -0.07  -0.06 
t-statistic -2.27 -2.61 1.49  -2.76 -3.26 -2.83  -2.28 
D(UNPL(-1)) 0.14 
 
-0.06  0.15 
 
0.06  0.17 
t-statistic 1.08 
 
-2.39  1.24 
 
0.44  1.33 
D(TNPL(-1)) 0.14 0.16  0.22 
  
   
t-statistic 1.39 1.79  2.31 
  
   
D(LD_IRS(-1)) 
  
  
  
  0.23 
t-statistic 
  
  
  
  0.52 
DR(-1) 
  
  0.10 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.10 
t-statistic 
  
  1.92 2.12 1.90 1.56 1.71 
C 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
t-statistic 2.68 2.92 2.80 1.61 2.79 3.15 2.90 1.70 2.70 
 
Statistics 
R
2 
0.36 0.38 0.38 0.21 0.38 0.40 0.40 0.15 0.39 
Akaike Criterion -7.69 -7.73 -7.68 -7.58 -7.74 -7.76 -7.72 -7.51 -7.69 
 Causality Wald-Test (P-Values) 
 M19 M20 M21 M22 M23 M24 M25 M26 M27 
D(UNPL) 0.28  0.82  0.22 0.12 0.66  0.18 
D(ETA) 
 
     0.31   
  34 
RGDP 0.02 
0.11 
 
0.25       
LG_R 
 
0.01 0.02  0.01 0.00 0.00  0.02 
D(TNPL) 0.16 0.07 0.14 0.02      
DR 
 
   0.05 0.03 0.06 0.12 0.09 
D(LD_IRS) 
 
       0.60 
All 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 
Notes: 
1. All variables are expressed in growth rates or first differences. 
2. The first panel of the table presents the estimates and associated t-statistics for the dynamic 
equation; the second panel presents the estimates and associated t-statistics for the 
exogenous (dummy) variable; the third panel presents the standard statistics for goodness of 
fit (R2) and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC); and the fourth panel presents the p-values 
for standard causality tests, with the null hypothesis being that the respective explanatory 
variable does not cause LLR. 
3. C10 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 from Q1 2010 onwards and the value zero (0) 
otherwise. 
 
 
Table 4: Estimated models M28-M35 for loans loss provisions. 
 
M28 M29 M30 M31 M32 M33 M34 M35 
D(LLR(-1)) -0.05 0.14 0.06 0.04 0.02 -0.30 0.32 0.36 
t-statistic -0.29 0.89 0.32 0.20 0.13 -1.75 1.92 2.13 
RGDP(-1) -0.08 
 
 -0.10 -0.06 -0.07   
t-statistic -1.59 
 
 -1.98 -1.01 -1.29   
D(ETA(-1)) 
  
  
  
0.17  
t-statistic 
  
  
  
2.50  
LG_R(-1) -0.07 
 
-0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.03   
t-statistic -2.93 
 
-2.12 -2.61 -2.20 -1.44   
D(UNPL(-1)) 
 
0.35 0.23  0.14 0.13 0.23  
t-statistic 
 
3.02 1.94  0.95 1.07 2.04  
D(LD_IRS(-1)) 0.18 0.67   
  
  
t-statistic 0.43 1.61   
  
  
DR(-1) 0.11 
 
  
  
  
t-statistic 1.99 
 
  
  
  
D(GLTA(-1)) 
  
0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.02 
t-statistic 
  
-0.04 -0.14 -0.09 0.58 0.33 -0.50 
C 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
t-statistic 3.11 2.43 3.10 3.71 3.20 1.11 1.54 2.55 
 Exogenous-Variables 
C10 
     
0.01 
 
 
t-statistic 
     
3.82 
 
 
 
Statistics 
R
2 
0.40 0.29 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.54 0.35 0.11 
Akaike Criterion -7.71 -7.64 -7.64 -7.64 -7.62 -7.92 -7.68 -7.46 
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 Causality Wald-Test (P-Values) 
 M28 M29 M30 M31 M32 M33 M34 M35 
D(UNPL) 
 
0.00 0.05  0.34 0.29 0.04  
D(ETA) 
 
     0.01  
RGDP 0.00   0.05 0.31 0.20   
LG_R 0.11  0.03 0.01 0.03 0.15   
DR 0.05        
D(LD_IRS) 0.67 0.11         
D(GLTA) 
 
 0.97 0.89 0.92  0.56 0.74 0.62 
All 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.62 
Notes: 
1. All variables are expressed in growth rates or first differences. 
2. The first panel of the table presents the estimates and associated t-statistics for the dynamic 
equation; the second panel presents the estimates and associated t-statistics for the 
exogenous (dummy) variable; the third panel presents the standard statistics for goodness of 
fit (R2) and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC); and the fourth panel presents the p-values 
for standard causality tests, with the null hypothesis being that the respective explanatory 
variable does not cause LLR. 
3. C10 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 from Q1 2010 onwards and the value zero (0) 
otherwise. 
 
In the VAR equations that feature the quarterly change of the loan loss 
reserves ratio at the left-hand side, the coefficient of the first lag of that 
variable alters in sign across different model specifications and is not 
always significant (same result applies for models including more than 
one lags of Δ(LLR)). One possible explanation for this finding may relate 
to the fact that our loss reserves variable enters in first differences and 
thus, constitutes a flow variable. Recent empirical evidence on the sign 
(and the significance) of the lagged non-performing loans variable or 
that of the flow of loss provisions is somewhat ambiguous. For instance, 
in their earlier contributions for Italy by Salas and Saurina (2002) and 
Quagliariello (2007) find that the flow of provisions exhibits some 
positive persistence. These authors explain this finding on the basis that 
it usually takes some time for NPLs to be written off of banks’ balance 
sheets. On the other hand, in their panel data study on Greek NPLs, 
Louzis et al. (2012) document a negative and significant coefficient on 
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the lagged NPLs variable for the case of consumer and corporate loans, 
along with an insignificant coefficient for mortgage loans. They explain 
this finding on the basis that NPLs are likely to decrease when they have 
increased in the previous quarter, due to write-offs.  
In all estimated models, the coefficients of the lagged real GDP growth 
and the quarterly change in the unemployment rate have the expected 
signs (negative and positive, respectively) and are statistically significant 
(models M1 & M2). Furthermore, the magnitude of these coefficients 
exhibits notable stability across model specifications. This result provides 
evidence in favor of the procyclicality hypothesis as regards the 
provisioning policies of Greek banks at an aggregate level and is in line 
with the findings of numerous earlier empirical studies on the behavior 
of loan loss reserves and provisions. On the other hand, it implies that 
the procyclicality argument advanced by Borio et al. (2001) and Lowe 
(2002) does not apply to the provisioning practices followed by the 
domestic credit institutions in recent years.  
In more detail, our findings show that, at an aggregate level, Greek 
banks take higher provisions (and increase their loan loss reserves) when 
domestic macroeconomic conditions deteriorate and vice versa. 
Estimates of bi-variate VAR models that include real GDP growth or, 
alternatively, the change in the unemployment rate as the sole 
explanatory variable suggest that domestic banks respond relatively 
quickly to macroeconomic shocks, with the peak change in the LLR ratio 
being realized within two quarters. Yet, the effects of such shocks on the 
provisioning behavior of the domestic banking system shows significant 
persistence; in more detail, the impact of GDP shocks on loss reserves 
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dies out in about 10 quarters, while the impact of shocks on the 
unemployment rate persists for a considerably longer period i.e., it takes 
about 20 quarters for these effects to die out (see impulse response 
graphs of Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Impulse response of D(LLR)  to Cholesky’s one s.d. RGDP and D(UNPL) innovation for VAR 
models M1 & M2 respectively. 
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In terms of the respective quantitative impacts, our estimates show that 
a 1 percentage point (ppt) decline (increase) in real GDP growth leads to 
an increase (decline) of 0.11ppts in the quarterly change of the loss 
reserves ratio after a quarter, with the corresponding long-run effect 
being around 0.18ppts. This is actually comparable with the respective 
impacts documented in some earlier studies for other euro area 
economies. For instance, in a dynamic panel model estimated for a large 
number of Italian intermediaries over the period 1985-2002, 
Quagliariello (2007) finds that the long-run effect of a 1 percent GDP 
change on loan loss provisions is 0.13 (and 0.17 in the respective static 
model specification). As to the impact of labor market conditions, our 
estimates show that a 1 percent increase (decrease) in the 
unemployment rate leads to an increase (decrease) in the change of the 
LLR ratio by 0.26 percent after a quarter and by 0.27ppts in the long-run. 
These results are also in broad agreement with the estimates derived 
from the rest of the VAR specifications analyzed in this study as well as 
the single equation models presented in Table 5.  
 
The coefficient of the lagged real growth of residential house prices is 
found to have the expected sign (negative), but not to be always 
significant. This especially applies to VAR model specifications that also 
include other macroeconomic indicators of the state of the macro 
economy e.g. GDP growth and unemployment rate (models M3 & M4). 
To the extent that our RHP variable constitutes a sound coincident 
indicator of the phase of the business cycle, the aforementioned result 
may be seen as providing some incremental support to the procyclicality 
hypothesis of banks’ aggregate provisioning policies. On the other hand, 
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our results do not support an alternative hypothesis postulating that in 
periods of increased collateral valuations banks may be tempted to 
reduce their screening activity making their portfolios riskier, which 
would in turn imply a positive association between LLRs and house 
prices. 
The effect of inflation on the Greek banking system’s loan loss reserves 
ratio is found to be ambiguous in sign and statistically insignificant in 
most estimated models (models M5 & M6). This is broadly in agreement 
with the findings of a number of recent empirical studies (see e.g. Nkusu, 
2011). On the one hand, higher inflation erodes the real value of 
outstanding debt, thus making debt servicing easier. Other things being 
equal, the latter implies a lower volume of bank loans and thus, a lesser 
need for taking provisions (negative association). On the other hand, 
higher inflation may reduce real incomes (when prices are sticky) and 
thus, affect negatively the ability of borrowers to service their loans. 
This, in turn, would imply a positive association between inflation and 
the ratio of loan loss reserves. In our study, we find no conclusive 
evidence in favor of either of the aforementioned hypotheses.  
The estimated coefficient of the real loan interest rate, L_RIR, is mostly 
negative in sign, regardless of whether it is measured in levels or 
quarterly changes (models M7-M9). Although this is not always found to 
be statistically significant, it seems a bit counterintuitive to us on the 
basis that an increase in loan servicing costs should normally hinder the 
debt servicing capacity of borrowers, leading to a higher number of bad 
loans in the future and thus, higher provisions to account for such loans. 
It also appears to be in disagreement with the findings of several earlier 
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empirical studies. For example, in a recent analysis on the determinants 
of non-performing loans in the Greek banking system, Monokroussos et 
al. (2016a) document a positive and significant coefficient on the real 
loan interest rate, both at an aggregate level (all loans) and for the major 
categories (consumer, mortgage and corporate) of bank loans.   
Separately, the coefficient of the loans-to-deposits interest rate spread, 
Δ(LD_IRS), is insignificant in all cases and also with alternating sign 
(positive in the estimated VARs and negative in the single equation 
model specifications) (models M27-M29). As we have already noted, this 
variable can be viewed as a proxy for the degree of risk taking by 
domestic credit institutions. A positive association between the said 
variable and non-performing loans (and hence, loss provisions and 
reserves) could be interpreted as evidence favoring the view that Greek 
banks engage in riskier activities by selecting lower credit quality 
borrowers to whom they charge higher interest rates. The 
aforementioned analysis shows that our empirical results do not provide 
evidence in support of that hypothesis. This is despite the fact that in the 
latter part of our data sample there has mostly been a positive co-
movement of LLRs and the loans-to-deposits interest rate spread due to 
the deep economic recession and the incipient tightening of domestic 
financial conditions. The latter saw major Greek banks becoming 
extremely cautious in extending new credit to domestic households and 
businesses, with loan interest rates lagging significantly behind the 
gradual declining trend in deposit interest rates witnessed after the first 
half of 2012.  
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The coefficient of our bank capitalization indicator, Δ(ETA), is found to 
be positive and significant in the majority of model specifications under 
study (models M10-M14). This result argues against the so-called capital 
management hypothesis, which postulates that banks with low 
regulatory capital are inclined to take more general provisions in order 
to keep their capital ratios adequate (negative association between loan 
loss reserves and the equity to assets ratio). On the contrary, our 
analysis shows that in the Greek banking system strongly capitalized 
banks tend to take more provisions (and loan loss reserves) than weakly 
capitalized banks. However, an alternative explanation for the positive 
coefficient on the ETA variable is as follows: the sharp increase of non-
performing loans and, by implication, of loss provisions and reserves has 
been one of the main reasons that necessitated the three major 
recapitalizations (in early 2013, mid 2014 and late 2015) of the domestic 
banking system in order to boost the capital base of Greek credit 
institutions to levels above the required regulatory minimum. This point 
mostly applies to the latter part (crisis period) of our data sample and 
relates especially to the latest two recapitalizations.10 Note that a 
positive (though insignificant) coefficient on the ratio of bank capital to 
total assets is also reported in a dynamic panel analysis of the EU 
banking system presented in Bikker and Metzemakers (2015).   
The coefficient of the real growth of both total and performing loans is 
negative and significant in all estimated models (M15-M18). This finding 
is in line with the classical procyclicality hypothesis of bank provisioning 
policies and it runs counter to an alternative hypothesis claiming that 
                                                 
10
 It can be argued that the 1
st
 recapitalization of the domestic banking system (early 2012) was 
mainly caused by the debt restructuring of Greece’s sovereign debt held by private-sector accounts 
(PSI), which completely wiped out the capital base of major Greek banks.   
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loan portfolio risks are actually building up during economic booms, 
which would instead imply a positive coefficient on loans growth (Borio 
et al., 2001; and Lowe, 2002).  
As we noted in section 4.3 of this paper, the finding of a negative 
coefficient on the growth of loans in conjunction with a positive 
coefficient on the loans to assets ratio could be interpreted as 
supporting the view that provisions tend to increase as a share of total 
assets when the increase of new lending raises the risk exposure of 
banks portfolios (see e.g. Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005). In all VAR 
model specifications estimated in our study, the loans to assets ratio is 
found to be insignificant and with alternating sign both when estimated 
alone or in conjunction with the loans growth variable (models M30-
M35). Therefore, based on this evidence alone, we cannot infer that the 
evolution of gross loans to assets ratio signifies an overly aggressive 
lending strategy by Greek credit institutions.   
Finally, as expected, the estimated coefficients on the quarterly change 
in the non-performing loans to total loans ratio, Δ(TNPL) and the default 
rate, DR, are found to be positive and mostly significant (models M19-
M22 and M23-M26).   
5.2  Robustness & Stability Analysis: Single Equation Models 
As a robustness check to the estimation procedure under study, we also 
run a series of single equation models that express loss reserves as a 
function of a range of macro- and bank-related variables that have 
mostly been found to be significant in the VAR equations (Table 5). 
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Table 5: Single bi- and multivariate models. 
Bivariate single models 
Estimation period 2005Q1-2015Q4 
 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
@TREND 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 
RGDP(-1) -0.09  
 
  
D(ETA) 
 
-0.18 
 
  
LTD(-1) 
 
 0.02   
D(UNPL(-1)) 
 
 
 
0.29  
INFL(-1)) 
 
 
 
 0.17
$
 
Estimation period 2010Q1-2015Q4 
 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
@TREND 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.01 
RGDP(-1) -0.21  
 
  
D(ETA) 
 
-0.19 
 
  
LTD(-1) 
 
 0.01   
D(UNPL(-1)) 
 
 
 
0.34  
INFL(-1)) 
 
 
 
 0.07
$
 
Multivariate single models 
Estimation period 2005Q1-2015Q4 
 
S6 S7 S8 S9 
@TREND 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 
RGDP(-1) 
 
 
 
-0.07 
D(ETA) -0.17 -0.17 -0.18 -0.17 
LTD(-1) 0.01  0.02  
D(UNPL(-1)) 0.15 0.26 
 
 
Estimation period 2010Q1-2015Q4 
 
S6 S7 S8 S9 
@TREND 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.04 
RGDP(-1) 
 
 
 
-0.12 
D(ETA) -0.18 -0.18 -0.19 -0.18 
LTD(-1) 0.01  0.02  
D(UNPL(-1)) 0.17 0.30 
 
 
Notes: 
1. All estimated coefficients are significant except those of the inflation variable (superscripted in $). 
2. The first panel of the table presents coefficient estimates from single bivariate models estimated 
over the full data sample (2005Q1 to 2010Q1) and over the reduced (post crisis outbreak) sample 
2010Q1-2015Q4. The second panel presents the respective estimates of the multivariate models.   
A quite interesting result inferred by the estimates presented in Table 5 
is that the impact of shocks in explanatory variables on the loan loss 
reserves ratio has become stronger (in terms of magnitude and 
statistical significance) in the period following the outbreak of the Greek 
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crisis. For instance, in a bi-variate single equation model that is 
estimated from Q1 2010 onwards and includes GDP as the sole 
explanatory variable, a 1ppt decline in real GDP growth leads after a 
quarter to a 2.1ppts increase in the LLR ratio. This compares with an 
estimated impact of c. 0.9ppt when the full data set (Q1 2005-Q4 2015) 
is used in the estimation. The respective bi-variate model coefficients for 
the unemployment rate are 0.34 for the post crisis period and 0.29 for 
the full time horizon. From a macro policy perspective, these results 
indicate that a sustainable stabilization of macroeconomic conditions is a 
key precondition for safeguarding domestic financial stability. From a 
regulatory standpoint, the results suggest that the possibility of (macro) 
regime-related effects on banks’ provisioning policies should be taken 
into account when supervisory authorities design and implement macro 
prudential stress tests of the banking system.  
Towards this direction, our stability diagnostics results validate the post-
crisis outbreak regime (from 2010Q1 onwards). As shown in Figure 2, the 
Quandt-Andrews breakpoint test indicates two structural breaks when 
LTDt-1 and D(ETA)t  are jointly considered  as breakpoint variables for 
model S8 and RGDPt-1 and D(ETA)t for model S9, respectively. In the 
case of S8, the Likelihood Ratio F-statistic rejects the null hypothesis of 
no breakpoints in Q1 2010 as well as in the period between Q3 2012 and 
Q3 2013. For model S9, the maximal individual chow F-statistic occurs 
also in Q1 2010. 
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Figure 2. Individual Likelihood Ratio F-statistics series of Quandt-Andrews breakpoint test for models 
8 (up) and S9 (down). 
 
Notes: 
1. The QLR statistic for model S8 is 6.85 at Q2 2013 and for model S9 is 6.06 at Q1 2010.   
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Moreover, we find similar results for models S8 and S9 when multiple 
breakpoint tests are applied (see Table 6). F-statistics from Bai-Perron’s 
sequentially determined breaks reject the null hypothesis in both models 
for Q1 2010 and Q2 2013. Hence, the increased estimated impact 
observed in most bi- and multivariate single equations can be justified 
on the basis of the post-crisis outbreak regime. 
Table 6: Multiple breakpoint test for models S8 & S9. 
 
Bai-Perron tests of L+1 vs. L sequentially determined breaks 
Multiple breakpoint tests for S8 model 
Break Test F-statistic Scaled F-statistic Critical  Value 
0 vs. 1 6.85 13.70 9.81 
1 vs. 2 10.34 20.69 11.40 
Break dates Sequential Repartition  
1 2013Q2 2010Q1  
2 2010Q1 2013Q2  
Multiple breakpoint tests for S9 model 
Break Test F-statistic Scaled F-statistic Critical  Value 
0 vs. 1 6.05 12.11 9.81 
1 vs. 2 8.85 17.70 11.40 
Break dates Sequential Repartition  
1 2013Q2 2010Q1  
2 2010Q1 2013Q2  
Notes: 
1. Breakpoint variables are LTDt-1 and D(ETA)t for model S8 and RGDPt-1 and D(ETA)t for model S9 
2. Data are trimmed by 15% where we exclude the first and last 7.5% of the observations; 
3. Significance level 0.10; Maximum breakpoints 2  
 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
This study utilizes a new set of macroeconomic and regulatory data to 
analyze the evolution of loan loss provisioning practices in the Greek 
banking system over the period 2005-2015. This is performed by 
examining the determinants of the aggregate (industry-wide) loan loss 
reserves to total loans ratio, which reflects the accumulation of 
  47 
provisions net of write-offs and constitutes an important metric of the 
credit quality of loan portfolios. Our empirical findings make several 
contributions to the literature, especially as the behavior of provisioning 
policies in the Greek banking system has not been thoroughly analyzed 
in the past. Among others, we empirically document that, at an 
aggregate level, Greek banks generally behave in line with the stylized 
facts of provisioning policy procyclicality, taking higher provisions (and 
increase their loan loss reserves) when domestic macroeconomic 
conditions deteriorate. On the other hand, our results do not provide 
evidence in support of the so-called capital management hypothesis, 
which postulates that banks with low regulatory capital are inclined to 
take more general provisions in order to keep their capital ratios 
adequate. On the contrary, our analysis shows that in the Greek banking 
system more strongly capitalized banks tend to take more provisions 
(and increase their loan loss reserves) than weakly capitalized banks. 
Separately, our estimates show that domestic banks respond relatively 
quickly to macroeconomic shocks, with the peak quarterly change in the 
loan loss reserves ratio (i.e., the flow of provisions net of write offs) 
being realized within two quarters. Yet, the effects of such shocks on the 
provisioning behavior of the domestic banking system show significant 
persistence. Another interesting finding of our analysis is that the impact 
of macroeconomic shocks on the loan loss reserves ratio has become 
stronger (both in terms of magnitude and statistical significance) 
following the outbreak Greek sovereign debt crisis. From a macro policy 
perspective, this result indicates that a sustainable stabilization of 
macroeconomic conditions is a key precondition for safeguarding 
domestic financial stability. For a regulatory standpoint, it suggests that 
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the possibility of macroeconomic regime-related effects on banks’ 
provisioning policies should be taken into account when macro 
prudential stress tests of the banking system are designed and 
implemented. 
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